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QUESTION FOR REVIEW 
DID THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARD FACTS AND 
OTHERWISE IGNORE STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW IN REACHING 
ITS OPINION? 
REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 
74 Ut. Adv. Rep. 35 (Ct. App. 1988) (copy attached as 
Exhibit A). 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The decision being reviewed was entered on January 
28, 1988. Gleave's Petition for Rehearing was filed on 
February 10, 1988. The Petition was denied on February 22, 
1988. By order of March 15, 1988, this court extended the 
time for filing the Petition for Certiorari to April 5, 1988 
(copy attached as Exhibit B). 
Jurisdiction of this court is conferred by Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(5) (Amended 1986). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980); Little 
America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112 (Utah 1982). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Gleave was injured in an auto-train collision. 
Gleave sued Denver & Rio Grande (hereafter Rio Grande) on the 
theory that the crossing was dangerous. The jury returned a 
verdict that Gleave was 0 percent negligent and Rio Grande 
was 100 percent negligent. The jury made a substantial award 
of compensatory damages. 
Gleave also claimed punitive damages. After all 
evidence was received, the court directed a verdict removing 
punitive damages from the case. 
Gleave* appealed from the trial court's ruling on 
punitive damages.2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT REFUSED TO CONSTRUE THE FACTS IN 
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO GLEAVE 
Rio Grande made the motion for a directed verdict 
on punitive damages. On that issue, Gleave was the losing 
Lh more detailed factual analysis is included at Point 
One of the argument. Photocopies of the record are appended 
to this brief so that the court can verify the substance of 
the citation. 
^Rio Grande appealed on other grounds. 
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party. The Court of Appeals clearly understood the ap-
propriate standard of review: 
In reviewing the correctness of the trial 
court's grant of a directed verdict to 
Rio Grande on Gleave's punitive damage 
claim, we must view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to him, the party 
against whom the motion was made. Kim v. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270, 1271 (Utah 
1980). If there is no evidence to 
justify punitive damages, the issue was 
properly withheld from the jury. Tripp 
v. Baqley, 75 Utah 42, 282 P. 1026 
(1929). If, however, reasonable 
inferences supporting judgment for the 
losing party could be drawn from the 
evidence presented at trial, the directed 
verdict cannot be sustained. Little 
America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 
112, 114 (Utah 1982); Kim, 610 P.2d at 
1271. This is so even if reasonable 
persons might reach different conclusions 
on the punitive damage issue after 
considering the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences therefrom. See 
Little America Refining Co., 641 P.2d at 
114. 
74 Ut. Adv. Rep. at p.41. 
The problem is that the Court of Appeals mouthed 
the words, but then did exactly the opposite. 
A. Near Misses. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals states that 
plaintiff had offered no evidendce of "near misses." (74 
Ut. Adv. Rep. at p. 41.) However, that statement was not 
true. There was significant evidence of "near misses." (R. 
3 
1683-1686.) In fact, there were eight prior "near misses." 
(One car had two separate near misses.) One of the "near 
misses" involved a mother and her children. 
Gleave filed a Petition for Rehearing on this 
point. In response, the Court of Appeals stated: 
Plaintiff Gleave filed with this court a 
petition for reconsideration of whether 
the trial court erred in granting 
Defendant Rio Grande's motion for 
directed verdict on Gleave's punitive 
damage claim. In support of his 
petition, Gleave correctly asserts that, 
in evaluating the evidence on this point, 
we took into consideration the absence of 
any evidence of near misses at the 
subject railroad crossing. However, he 
indicates in his petition--for the first 
time — that his near-miss and prior 
accident evidence was excluded in a pre-
trial ruling. Because Gleave did not 
raise in his cross-appeal the issue of 
wheth€5r the court erroneously excluded 
his proffered near-miss and prior 
accident evidence, we have not and will 
not address that issue. 
(See Exhibit C.) 
It is true that neither party briefed the eviden-
tiary issue of "near misses." It was certainly Gleave's 
right--and Gleave's risk--to rely on other evidence, and to 
ignore the "near misses" evidence. The Court of Appeals, 
likewise, had every right to ignore the "near miss" evidence, 
since it was not raised in the briefs. 
However, the Court of Appeals chose to search the 
record and to raise the issue of "near misses" sua sponte. 
4 
Gleave concedes that the Court of appeals had power to search 
the record and raise issues sua sponte. (See e.g. Swenson v. 
Thibaut, 250 S.E.2d 279, 293 (N.C. 1978). However, having 
raised the issue, the Court of Appeals should have resolved 
it! Instead, after raising the issue sua sponte, the Court 
of Appeals relied on a clearly erroneous ruling of the trial 
court. That was an error of law and an abdication of 
appellate jurisdiction. 
We hold the trial court erred in dismiss-
ing plaintiff's action . . . In passing 
on this assignment of error, evidence 
erroneously excluded is to be considered 
with other evidence offered by plain-
tiffs. Woodward v. Pressley, 249 S.E.2d 
471 (N.C. App. 1978). 
• * * 
In considering whether the trial court 
should have sustained defendant's motions 
for directed verdicts, this court will 
look to all the competent evidence, 
including facts which were shown by proof 
but which were withdrawn from the jury by 
the trial judge, especially where such 
evidence was improperly withdrawn, as we 
think was true in this case. Beene v. 
Cook, 311 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tenn. 1957). 
• * * 
In passing on the sufficiency of the 
evidence, we have considered that offered 
by plaintiff and improperly excluded by 
the court. Smith v. J.C. Penny Co., 149 
N.W.2d 794 (Iowa 1967) . 
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B. Prior Injuries. 
The Court of Appeals opinion stresses that there 
were no accidents at the crossing up to the time of UDOT's 
inspection and evaluation in 1974. (74 Ut. Adv. Rep. at 
p. 41.) However, there were two accidents after that inspec-
tion, between 1974 and 1982. One of those accidents involved 
serious injuries. In the second accident, the car was only 
grazed. (R. 1685.) 
C. Temporary Stop Sign. 
The Court stressed that Rio Grande had installed a 
stop sign to improve safety until flashing lights could be 
installed. (74 Ut. Adv. Rep. at p.41.) The Court of Appeals 
supposed this was evidence of good faith. 
However, there was evidence that the stop sign did 
little or nothing to improve safety. Before the stop sign 
was installed, the Utah County Surveyor wrote: 
It is also their feeling [County Road 
Commission] that very few people will pay 
attention to them [stop signs]. However, 
it would place responsibility on the 
driver if he violated the stop sign and 
was involved in an accident. 
(See plaintiff's Exhibit 12.) 
From this letter, a jury could infer that Rio 
Grande's purpose in placing the stop sign had nothing to do 
6 
with public safety. Rather, Rio Grande's purpose was simply 
to get some legal protection from lawsuits. 
Rio Grande knew that the crossing remained very 
dangerous even with the stop sign. (R. 1238-1241.) Indeed, 
there is evidence from which a jury could infer that the stop 
sign made the crossing more dangerous. (R. 1588-89, 1606.) 
A jury might infer that to place a stop sign--and nothing 
more—was evidence that Rio Grande acted in reckless 
disregard to public safety. 
D. Rural Locality, 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals stressed 
". . . The locality was rural, and the road was not heavily 
travelled." (74 Ut. Adv. Rep. at p. 41.) In fact, the 
crossing is in the moderately built-up area of town and 
serves a residential subdivision. (See plaintiff's Exhibit 
8.) The jury could infer from the evidence that the road 
bears a medium amount of traffic--especially women and 
children. Certainly, it is incorrect to regard this as a 
"rural" crossing. 
E. Knowledge of Danger. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals stressed that, 
"There is no evidence that Rio Grande knew or should have 
7 
known of the facts discovered by Gleave's expert . . . " 
(74 Ut. Adv. Rep. at p.41.) Gleave concedes that punitive 
damages should not lie if Rio Grande did not have knowledge 
of the danger. 
However, Rio Grande built the railroad and main-
tained it. A jury could easily infer that the builder of the 
railroad had actual knowledge of the danger. If not, the 
railroad was reckless for building a railroad without any 
thought or analysis of the public danger. 
Moreover, Gleave respectfully submits that the 
Court of Appeals refused to consider the testimony of Joseph 
Yuhas. Yuhas worked for the State of Utah. In 1975 (eight 
years before the accident), Yuhas met with a representative 
of Rio Grande at the crossing to make an official joint 
inspection. Th€» purpose of the inspection was to inspect the 
safety of the crossing, including warning signs and sight 
distance. (R. 1238.) 
The specific findings of that inspection were: 
The sight distance, alignment of track 
and highway approach gradient, condition 
of th€* road surface and condition of the 
crossing are poor. 
(R. 1241.) 
Thus, Rio Grande knew as early as 1974 the specific 
danger at that crossing. Also, Rio Grande's engineer in 
charge of all trackage travelled over that specific curve 
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between once each week and once each month for over ten 
years. (R.1329.) Finally, this specific crossing was 
inspected by Rio Grande on a regular basis. (R. 1326.) 
In short, there was abundant evidence from which a 
jury could infer that Rio Grande had actual knowledge of the 
danger. 
F. Highly Unreasonable Conduct. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals stressed that 
there was no extreme departure from ordinary care. "At 
worst, the evidence shows errors of judgment . . . in failing 
to take steps to reduce the risks at this crossing." (74 Ut. 
Adv. Rep. at p. 19.) It is respectfully submitted that the 
jury might see it otherwise. 
One of plaintiff's experts testified that this was 
the worst out of thousands of crossings he had inspected. 
(74 Ut. Adv. Rep. at p. 37.) Without more, a jury might find 
that to be "highly unreasonable conduct." Furthermore, it 
would have been easy and cheap to improve safety. All Rio 
Grande had to do was light a match and burn the weeds which 
obstructed vision. (R. 1597.) 
Next, this was not a case where Rio Grande over-
looked some safety procedures at a single intersection. 
Rather, this is a case where Rio Grande completely ignores 
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automobile safety at every crossing in Utah as a matter of 
policy. Rio Grande has no rules or regulations with respect 
to safety procedures for such blind crossings. (R. 1333.) 
For example, Rio Grande does not even consider such blind 
crossings in setting train speeds. (R. 1334.) Indeed, Rio 
Grande has no rules or regulations or standards at all with 
respect to automobile safety. (R. 1338o) 
A jury might do more than find this to be "highly 
unreasonable conduct." A jury might be outraged.^ After 
all, when a car and a train collide, the car never wins. 
G. Public Objectives, 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals stated that, 
"Gleave has not directed our attention to any public objec-
tive which would clearly be accomplished by an award of 
punitive damages herein." (74 Ut. Adv. Rep. at p.42.) 
JThe failure to have any policy at all for automobile-
safety is in direct conflict with the laws of this state. 
The Court of Appeals has stated: "The statute relied upon by 
Rio Grande does not relieve it of the duty to operate trains 
with reasonable care, nor does it prohibit Rio Grande from 
exercising reasonable care in the operation of its trains and 
the maintenance of its right-of-way. Rio Grande cannot 
ignore the public peril at a more than ordinarily hazardous 
crossing and excuse itself until UDOT takes action to upgrade 
the safety devices at the 1600 South crossing. Rio Grande 
remains subject to a standard of care which, under the 
circumstances of the crossing, could require actions to 
reduce risks imposed on the public." (74 Ut. Adv. Rep. at 
p.36.) 
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It is respectfully submitted that there is a 
public objective. The public objective is to protect the 
public at all of the other railroad crossings in Utah. 
There is evidence in this case that Rio Grande had 
actual knowledge of the danger. (See paragraph E above.) 
There is further evidence that Rio Grande has no rules or 
regulations or standards at all with respect to automobile 
safety. (See paragraph F above.) Thus, similar dangers may 
be lurking at hundreds of other railroad crossings in Utah. 
By permitting punitive damages now, lives may be 
saved tomorrow! 
Gleave cited numerous cases to the Court of Appeals 
which squarely allow punitive damages in railroad crossing 
cases. (In fact, Rio Grande cited no cases to the contrary.) 
The basis is that a public objective will be served to 
penalize a railroad for reckless disregard of public safety. 
See, Poole v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 638 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 
1982); Hazelwood v. 111. Central Gulf R.R., 450 N.E.2d 1199 
(111. App. 1983); Brown v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 703 F.2d 
1050 (8th Cir. 1983); Matkovich v. Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co., 431 N.E.2d 652 (Ohio 1982); Stromquist v. Bur-
lington Northern, Inc., 444 N.E.2d 1113 (111. App. 1983); 
Runkle v. Burlington Northern, 613 P.2d 982 (Mont. 1980); 
Lowery v. Seabord Coastline R.R. Co., 241 S.E.2d 158 
11 
(SoCal. 19 78); Estate of Clifton v. Southern Pacific Transp., 
686 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. App. 1985). 
POINT II 
THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAN BE 
TRIED SEPARATELY, AND THERE IS NO NEED 
TO RETRY THE LIABILITY ISSUES 
Gleave has received a jury verdict that he is 0 
percent negligent and that Rio Grande is 100 percent negli-
gent. The preferred procedure is to affirm that verdict and 
remand for the sole purpose of a new trial on punitive 
damages. See e.g., Fiberboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. East Bay 
Union of Mach. , 39 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1964), where the court 
stated: 
An appellate court has power to remand 
cases for retrial on a single issue such 
as damages (citations omitted), and this 
power includes a retrial on the limited 
issue of exemplary damages. (citations 
omitted), 
Id. at p.100. See also, Olin Corp. v. Dyson, 678 S.W.2d 650 
(Tex. App. 1984); Alhino v. Starr, 169 Cal. Rptr. 136; 112 
Cal. App. 3d 158 (1981); Rosner v. Sears Roebuck, 168 Cal. 
Rptr. 237; 110 Cal. App. 3d 740 (1980). 
Indeed, it is not uncommon to bifurcate the issues 
of compensatory damages and punitive damages. Rupert v. 
Sellers, 368 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1975); James D. Vollertson Assts., 
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Inc. v, John Nothnaqle, Inc., 369 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1975); Newton 
v. Yates, 353 N.E.2d 485 (Ind. App. 1976); Chupp v. Hender-
son, 216 S.E.2d 366 (Ga. 1975). See also, Punitive Damages 
Law & Practice, Callaghan 1984 Ed., §12.04. If the punitive 
damage claim can be bifurcated into a separate trial, it 
follows a priori that remand for a trial on the limited issue 
of punitive damages would be appropriate. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI IN ORDER 
TO SUPERVISE THE CONDUCT OF AN INFERIOR COURT 
Rule 4 3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
states in part: 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a 
matter of right, but of judicial discre-
tion, and will be granted only when there 
are special and important reasons 
therefore. The following . . . indicate 
the character of reasons that will be 
considered. 
• * * 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has rendered a decision that has so far 
departed from the accepted course of 
judicial proceedings . . . as to call for 
the exercise of this Court's power of 
supervision . . . . 
In this case, the Court of Appeals made its own 
inferences from the facts. However, that is the task of the 
jury—not the court. The standard of review required the 
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Court of AppeaLs to construe the facts in the light most 
favorable to Gleave. The Court of Appeals did exactly the 
opposite. In every case, the facts were construed in the 
light most favorable to Rio Grande. 
This Court should grant certiorari, not only to 
correct the mistake, but to supervise the Court of Appeals in 
correct appellate procedure for future cases. 
DATED this J day of ((ftCtL\_ , 1988. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & AwSSOClATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
By ,/ > y -
' ROBERT J. DEBRY 
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1 supposed to do? What were your instructions, other than 
2 just looking at it? 
3 A Our instructions were to inspect the condition of 
4 the planking, condition of the rail, condition of the 
5 highway, condition of existing facilities, such as advance 
6 warning signs on the pavement, advance warning signs, 
7 cross bucks, flashing lights, sight distance. 
8 Q Was anyone else present at the time of the 
9 inspection? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q Who was present at that time? 
12 A According to -- this was ten years ago -- according 
13 to my list there, there was, from our department, there was 
14 Woodrow Burnham, there was myself, there was a member of 
15 the Public Service Commission, Dean Hales, Mr. Dean Pitts 
16 from the D&RG Railroad, Stewart Christensen. 
17 Q Do you know Mr. Dean Pitts from the D&RG Railroad? 
18 Did anybody tell you what his title was? 
19 A No, no one told me what his title was, and yes, 
20 I did meet him. 
21 Q At the time of the inspection tell us how the 
22 inspection took place. Did you all walk around together, 
23 or how does it work? 
24 A Generally what we would do is Stewart would tell 
25 us how many crossings we were going to look at that day. 
Yuhas-D 483. 
We had an informal checklist that he would make up copies, 
enough for all of the people to have. On this checklist 
were several things, such as we would drive up to the 
crossing, we would look for pavement markings on the street. 
If there were any we would check yes or no. If there were 
any advance warning signs or so forth. 
Q Was the group all together as you went? 
A Generally, yes. We would either go in one or two 
cars, depending on how many people were there. Sometimes 
it was very hard to fit six adults in a car comfortably, 
so sometimes we would take one car; sometimes we would take 
two. 
Q You don't remember on this day whether you had one 
or two cars? 
A No , I don ? t:. 
Q In any case, the group was walking together as you 
walked? 
A Yes, we would approach the crossing and look for 
particular items, then we would find a convenient or safe 
spot to pull off the highway and then we would get together 
as a group and each one would give his recommendations or 
what they thought should be done. 
Q As you went through were there discussions back and 
forth about the conditions of crossings? 
A Yes. 
Yuhas-D 484. 
Q And at the conclusion of the meeting did you write -| 
A I did, yes. 
Q What were your recommendations at that time? 
A My recommendations were what is on that piece of 
paper, and I couldn't tell you what that is unless I look 
at the paper. 
Q Do you have any independent -- were the notes at 
the time you made them true and accurate? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you make them on or about the time of the visit^ 
A We would make them right there. 
Q And in what form did you make the notes? 
A I would generally have a clipboard with a particulaif 
crossing on there and I would go from the checklist, plus 
I had a notepad that I would write down any other informatiojn 
or I would write it on that piece of paper. 
Q Showing you this, would that refresh your 
recollection as to your findings on that date? 
A Yes. 
Q Tell the Court what your findings were. 
A This states: "Crossing number one sixty-eight, 
1420 South 190 East Springville, railroad milepost 695.41. 
This crossing consists of one track. There have been no 
accidents on this crossing. There are nine trains per day 
with the vehicular traffic of three hundred thirty-nine 
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.2y t r a f f i c . y[he s i g h t d i s t a n c e , a l ignmen t of 
track and highway approach gradient, condition of road 
surface and condition of the crossing are poor. 
Recommendations on this crossing include building up the 
approach areas- to reduce critical grade, grading and paving 
- i, hot,'. „ MiiExir-fiiBii' - • u j , 
; the^approlacheg and the crossing and installing ref lectorized 
r crjos&j bucksw|,,advancejiwarning .signs , pavement markings, 
3i?A^a^ifiSkA4ightiSsi>gnals wi,th twenty,,thousand lumenaire 
l^ ^^ n^ ,ilrit^ i^tet,,i.iic^ clienses Jdrlt .^ asferjurther recommended 
Q Thank you. Did you discuss that conclusion with 
the other people present during the evaluation? 
A Yes, we did. We would -- before we would leave for 
any other crossing we would discuss our findings together. 
We were all in a group like you or I gathered around a table 
there. 
Q And after you made the evaluation you went back, 
and what form did you give this to your boss? 
A It was in a handwritten form. Then I would general!] 
give it to oui secretary to type up. 
Q At that time was it your custom and practice to 
send out a copy of your findings to the other people on 
the team? 
A Generally it was, yes. 
y 
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1 (Reading) "Question: State the name of the person, 
2 firm or corporation or partnership which maintains the said 
3 railroad right-of-way and maintains all railroad crossing 
4 areas. 
5 "Answer: Denver & Rio Grande Western maintains 
6 the 1600 South crossing. 
7 "Question: Was the 1600 South railroad crossing 
8 inspected by you, your servants, agents, or employees at 
9 any time during the ten year period preceding the collision] 
10 nAnswer: Yes. 
11 "Question: State the date of the inspection. 
12 "Answer: The 1600 South crossing is inspected on 
13 a regular basis by employees of Denver & Rio Grande Western J 
14 and if defects are discovered they are brought to the 
15 attention of the maintenance department for correction. 
16 Additional track inspections are conducted from time to timq 
17 by a company named Sperry Rail Service. 
18 J "Question: Describe in reasonable detail each and 
19 every act undertaken by Denver & Rio Grande Western at 
20 any time within the ten year period from April 17, 1972, 
21 to April 16, 1982, for the purpose of providing for the 
22 safety of highway users at the 1600 South railroad crossing, 
23 "Answer: Between April 17, 1972, and April 16, 1982 
24 Denver & Rio Grande Western inspected the 1600 South 
25 crossing on a regular basis to insure that the crossing was 
571. 
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the crossing where the railroad accident happened two years 
ago with Mr. Gleave. 
Do you know the crossing I am referring to? 
A I've been told it was the crossing we call the 
Tin Barn Crossing. 
Q So if I use the words "Tin Barn Crossing" does 
that mean something to you? 
A Yes. 
Q And where did that name come from? 
A There's a large tin barn in the area. 
Q During the ten years you were division engineer 
how many times had you actually traveled over or looked at 
or inspected or been at that crossing? 
A I have no idea. Many times. Anytime you go over 
the eastbound track -- and I presume you are talking about 
the eastbound track? 
Q When you say "many times'1, have you been there more 
than an average of once a month? 
A Oh, probably more than that. 
Q More than an average of once a week? 
A No, probably not. 
Q Somewhere between once a week and once a month for 
the ten years you were division engineer. You were somehow 
at that crossing, is that fair? 
A I would go by there. I don't know that I'd be at it 
574. 
j a desired or permissible sight distance for the railroad 
_ engineer to see a railroad crossing? 
A No, not that I know of. 3 
4 Q Does Denver & Rio Grande Western have any regulations 
with respect to what is a permissible or desirable sight 
distance for a train engineer — locomotive engineer; that 
- I is, how far a locomotive engineer should be able to see a 
_ I crossing? 
A Not that I know of. 
Q When you're saying 'not that you know of1, is it 
possible somebody -else knows that you don't? 
A I don't think so. 
Q If anyone would know you would? 
A I would probably know it. 'No' is the answer." 
MR. DEBRY: There is another line -- 14. 
A "I guess." 
MR. DAVIS: So it says: "No is the answer, 
I guess." 
MR. DEBRY: Page 64. 
"What was the speed of -- what was the speed at 
the tin barn crossing? 
A At what time? 
Q At the time of the accident. 
A When was the accident? 
Q April 16, 1982. 
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A I believe the speed was fifty. 
Q Tell me the procedure under, as far as you know, 
the procedure under which a speed limit is established. 
What factors are taken into consideration?" 
MR. DAVIS: The pages are not in order. 
MR.. RICHMAN: I will read the answer. 
"Grade, curvature, track conditions." 
MR.. DEBRY: Okay. If you have got it, 
Mr. Richman, do you want to finish it? 
MR.. RICHMAN: Sure. 
(Question: Reading by Mr. Debry) "Who sets the 
speed limit? 
A (By Mr. Richman) "The chief of transportation 
officer. 
Q Is sight distance taken into consideration in 
establishing a speed limit? i 
A No. 
Q Do you know why not? 
A The speed limit in that particular territory is 
governed by centralized traffic control signals. 
Q What does that mean? 
A It means the signal tells you in advance whether 
there is a train ahead of you or not. 
Q And if the lights are green you go? 
A That is right. 
579 . 
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A Itfs passed around when it comes out just as a 
matter of information.'1 
MR. DEBRY: That is all, subject to one more 
ruling. Maybe we can do it at the side bar. 
(Discussion was had off the record.) 
(Whereupon, further reading was done of the 
deposition of Aberton.) 
(Mr. Debry read the questions and Mr. Richman read 
the answers as follows:) 
"Question: At the time you were division engineer 
did Denver & Rio Grande Western have any rules or regulation) 
or standards with respect to the safety at highway railroaG 
crossings for cars? 
A No. 
Q The answer is D&RG, Denver & Rio Grande Western, 
had no rules or standards or you as its division engineer 
had none? 
A The railroad company does not have any. 
Q Or at least you did not have any -- or at least 
did not have any at the time you were division engineer 
in Utah, is that correct? 
A Correct." 
MR. DEBRY: That is all, Your Honor. 
And subject to the other reservations we have made, we rest 
(The plaintiff rested.) 
583. 
1 American Association of State Highway and Transportation 
Officials of which Utah is a member, develops and provides 
3
 standards for design construction of highways, including 
4 grade crossing protection. 
5 Q In your opinion does the 1600 South crossing in 
6 Springville meet those design criteria for railroad 
7 crossings? 
8 A No, sir, it does not, 
9 Q In your opinion is the 1600 South crossing in 
10 Springville a safe crossing for motorists? 
11 A It definitely is not. 
12 Q How would you rate that as compared to other 
13 crossings? 
14 A Frankly for an eastbound driver it is by far the 
15 ! worst condition of a controlled stop sign crossing I have 
16 ever seen in looking at thousands of railroad crossings. 
17 Q Would you explain why it's unsafe? 
18 A Yes, sir 
19 MR. DEBRY: May he come to the chart, Your 
20 Honor. 
21 THE WITNESS: The principal reason that 
22 the crossing is not safe is that with the control devices 
23 that are present certain driver expectancies are provided 
24 to a driver that is approaching. Those driver expectancies 
25 are not met, and thus create a trap for an approaching 
Van Wagoner-D 372 
driver. The expectancy of a driver as defined in and by 
the Federal Highway Administration and the American 
Association of State Highway Transportation Officials ir 
that if there is a hazard or a nee°d for some activity that 
the driver will be made aware of that activity in sufficient 
time to take avoidance action. In this case there is 
a stop sign. The expectancy of a driver is that if they 
stop at the stop sign or a stop bar associated with the 
stop sign, that if they do that they will have sufficient 
visibility of any potential hazard that will^allnw them 
o^ make the decision about proceeding, and then proceed 
and clear the hazard before any conflict would develop. 
That does not occur here. And I have developed two overlays 
which show two cases that will demonstrate what I am talking 
about. 
MR. DUNN: Your Honor, could we proceed 
by question and answer rather than narrative? I think there) 
was one objection to the statement on that last scenario 
that I think could have been prevented had we not had 
just an open --
THE COURT: This is direct examination. 
You will need to conduct your examination by question and 
answer. 
Q (By Mr. Debry) Would you then please explain. 
Would it assist you in explaining your answer to use the 
Van Wagoner-D 373. 
sight distance at the crossing so that it is sufficient to 
see the hazard approaching. 
Q How do you improve sight distance? 
A There are several things that could be done. A 
very simple thing would be the removal of the weeds in 
the area. That is one thing that could be done. There 
is also a berming of earth that appears to have been left 
due to construction of the railroad originally that if 
that were removed would --
MR. RICHMAN: Your Honor, I object to that 
last statement as being pure speculation on the part of 
this witness. 
MR. DEBRY: I will lay a foundation. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained on 
that point. If you will lay a better foundation. 
Q (By Mr. Debry) When you visited the scene of the 
accident as a professional engineer could you determine 
what -- I will go back to the table — on the table model, 
which isn't here, but as the driver stops at the left there 
is what we call a mound of dirt with some weeds growing 
along. I will show you an Exhibit 2A and 2B which are 
basically the same thing. As a professional engineer were 
you able to form an opinion as to what formed that mound 
of earth? 
A Yes, sir. 
Van Wagoner-D 381. 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Would you read to the jury the excerpt on which 
you relied? 
A The specific excerpt, quoting again: ,fTo emphasi 
the point when motorists get the information they expect 
to get from the highway and its traffic control devices 
the performance tends to be rapid, appropriate, and error 
free. When they don't get what they expect or get what 
they don't expect, delay, inappropriate response, error 
and system failures are the usual results." 
Q In your opinion does the design of the 1600 South 
crossing in Springville violate that standard of driver 
expectancy? 
A It certainly does. 
Q Why? 
A Because there is a zone which I have shown on the 
diagrams that if we put a train coming in that zone at 
the speeds they travel there, there is certainty that a 
collision will occur when a driver is acting in a prudent 
way by stopping at a traffic control device and looking 
down the track. His expectancy is if he sees nothing he 
may proceed in safety, when in fact that is not true. 
MR. DEBRY: I think I am finished, Your 
Honor, if I could check my notes. 
That is all I have. 
Van Wagoner-D 390. 
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ask him to read the name and address of the proposed 
witness and then in two or three sentences tell what each 
witness would testify if he were permitted to appear. 
MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, I asked the people 
in the area surrounding the location. First of all, 
Norma Haws^ 1412 South 500 East. She was in a car four 
or five years ago going east in the afternoon. It was 
warm weather. No air conditioner was on. She thinks that 
the window was down. She doesn't remember if the radio 
was on. She stopped, looked and listened. She said we 
have lived around the track for many years and understand 
the dangers. nThatTs what upset me because there weren?t 
any distractions. I was shaking so bad I couldnTt even 
get out of the car, because I started to go and the train 
was there and I was just inches from the train." 
Sandy Smertick-)1690 South 350 East. She is very 
familiar with the crossing. She lives close to that and 
goes to stores in Spanish Fork. Picks up her husband from 
work. Two years -ago into wintertime, November or December, 
they were going slow. It wasn't snowing. It was a clear 
day. There might have been some snow. It wasnft a bad 
winter. Her sister was driving a Buick going east. She 
stopped, looked. The windows were rolled up. The heater 
was on. Right after she was coming home from exercises 
about 10:15 a.m. She started to go. For some reason after 
31. 
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she stopped at the stop sign she just happened to look 
again to the left and saw the train coming from the north, 
and she stopped. If she hadn't taken a second look she 
would have been hit. 
^iucinda 0fBrian} 1525 South 400 East #42. She 
goes to Spanish Fork also and has lived close by this 
track all her life. She was with her brother Tim a few 
years ago. It was night. She was going east. The windows 
were rolled up. It was kind of cold. She came to the 
tracks. She doesn't think the radio was on. She stopped, 
looked both ways, didn't see or hear anything, so went on 
and when she was on the tracks she saw the light. It 
wasn't very far away because she could see -- just after 
she got across the crossing the train whizzed by behind 
her. She says several times she's crossed the track and 
hasn't heard the horn and also that you can't tell which 
track the train is on because there is another track a 
block or so to the west or to the east. 
Angela'Murray7>320 East 1875 South. The 17th or 
18th of May she was traveling east. (Had her children)with 
her. The radio was not on. She stopped and at the 
stopping, started to go again and barely missed hitting 
one of those orange -- those small orange cars that come 
byc Not a train itself, but she barely missed it. 
an Mile?, 1652 South 300 East. This Was -- okay, 
32. 
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he had his daughter with him in the car. He stopped, 
looked and started to go, then they saw the light. It 
scared them very much, and ne said he didn't hear it, 
felt like it snuck up on him. 
Nora BiraS 1749 South Main. About three or four 
years ago she was with her husband and she was traveling 
west at this time and stopped and looked, didn't hear 
anything, and got just over the track and the train came 
by. Another time before she was married, about tea years 
ago, she was going east aid had the same situation happen 
to her. 
Terry Mattinsonp1245 West 1600 North. Going east 
two separate times approximately three years ago. They 
were going, they stopped, didn't hear or see anything, 
proceeded and a train came by. 
Do you want the ones going west also? 
We have two people who were actually injured. One 
y< v • « « ^ 
is aVsMrs. Mary McCloud7^ Her and her husband v,ere injured 
very badly at the crossing. She stopped. Her husband was 
drivingc She stopped, listened, didn't hear anything. 
I could give you the address. 1525 South 400 East #64. 
Traveling east. The train came from the north. Broke her 
ribs, chest bone. Her husband had cuts all over his head. 
^Mr. Will Lam Rus£)also had an accident. 290 South 
100 East in Saleti. Going east. Didn't stop. Well, he 
33. 
said he wasn't paying attention at the time, but the train 
barely knicked his bumper. 
MR. DEBRY: May the offer of proof show, 
in addition to describing their own near miss, they would 
each testify, if permitted, in their lay opinion it's a 
dangerous intersection. 
THE COURT: The record may so show, Mr. Debry| 
MR0 DEBRY: Your Honor, we had two motions 
in limine. 
THE COURT: Let's see --
MR. DEBRY: We have a motion in limine on 
the seat belt defense. 
THE COURT: The Court is inclined to grant 
that motion, primarily, at least to the extent that no 
mention of a seat belt is to be made in opening statements 
or until such time as there is some evidence in the record 
to demonstrate failure to have a seat belt in this particular 
case would be of any consequence. Let me just indicate — 
MR. DEBRY: Your Honor, to be specific, 
we don't object to the testimony coming in that he had or 
didn't have a seat belt on. The testimony will be he 
didn't have. The objection is that at this late date they 
want to have a jury instruction that the jury be instructed 
as a matter of law that he had a duty to have a seat belt. 
If he didn't they could consider that in mitigation of 
34. 
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On the contrary, Knight had an express 
contract with the corporation, and dealt excl-
usively with it in contracting to do the work, 
attempting to collect his bill, and filing his 
mechanics' lien. Thus, Knight did not have an 
implied contract with Post. See Commercial 
Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774. 
Since there was no express or implied con-
tract with Post, Knight cannot recover. 
The judgment of the trial court is reversed. 
Costs awarded to Post. 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. This statute reads, m relevant part, as follows: 
Actions to enforce the hens herein pro-
vided for must be begun within twelve 
months after the completion of the ori-
ginal contract .... Within the twelve 
months herein mentioned the lien clai-
mant shall file for record with the 
county recorder of each county in which 
the lien is recorded a notice of the pen-
dency of the action, in the manner 
provided in actions affecting the title or 
right to possession of real property, or 
the lien shall be void, except as to 
persons who have been made parties to 
the action and persons having actual 
knowledge of the commencement of the 
action. 
2. We note that the corporation's bankruptcy action 
did not necessarily preclude recovery under a prop-
erly filed mechanics' lien nor did it toll the requir-
ement of bringing an action to enforce such a lien 
within the statutory twelve month period. See Utah 
Code Ann. §38-1-5 (1974); Munson v. Risinger, 
114 So. 2d 59,61 (La. Ct. App. 1959). 
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OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
This action arises from a collision between 
an eastbound motor vehicle driven by Robert 
L. Gleave and an empty southbound coal train 
operated by an agent of the Denver & Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company. The 
accident occurred at daylight on April 16, 
1982, at the crossing of 1600 South Street in 
Springviile, Utah, and the railroad tracks. 
Gleave suffered severe personal injuries, and 
his vehicle was demolished. He filed this per-
sonal injury action, and a jury awarded him 
damages of $425,140.00 against the defendants 
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Company and Utah Railway Company, which 
we will refer to collectively as Rio Grande. 
The jury did not attribute any negligence to 
Gleave. Before trial, the Utah Department of 
Transportation ("UDOT") was dismissed from 
the case on sovereign immunity grounds. 
Rio Grande's appeal presents three substa-
ntial issues:1 (1) was Rio Grande relieved of its 
duty to Gleave because regulation and control 
of safety signals and devices at railroad-
highway crossings is the state's "exclusive" 
preempted domain? (2) was Gleave negligent 
as a matter of law? and (3) did the trial court 
err when it dismissed UDOT on grounds of 
sovereign immunity? Gleave has cross-
appealed on two points: (4) did the trial court 
erroneously grant Rio Grande's motion for a 
directed verdict On Gleave's claim for punitive 
damages? and (5) did the trial court err in 
denying prejudgment interest on Gleave's 
award of damages for lost future earnings and 
earning capacity? 
We affirm the judgment. 
I. DUTY OF RAILROAD COMPANY 
Rio Grande argues that "the joint jurisdic-
tion of these state agencies [i.e., UDOT and 
its reviewing agency, the Utah Public Service 
Commission] over the signs and control 
devices at railroad crossings remains exclusive 
and a private party, such as a railroad, has no 
more right to change the traffic protection 
signs at a public railroad crossing, than it 
would to change any other signs on a public 
highway." Rio Grande's "exclusivity" concl-
usion is based on its interpretation of Utah 
Oteat 
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Code Ann. §§54-4-15(2), (4) and 54-4-
15.1 (1986).2 In other words, Rio Grande 
claims it does not have any duty to the public 
because the duty has been preempted by the 
state. Gleave argues that it makes no differ-
ence who had the duty to install signs and 
signals at the collision crossing because that 
issue was not presented to the jury and 
because the jury decided that Rio Grande 
breached duties other than a duty to install 
better signs or control devices. 
Rio Grande's attempt to hide behind the 
statutes motivates us to seek further. Does not 
our law impose a basic duty of reasonable care 
and prudence upon Rio Grande, regardless of 
any statutory duty? We think so. In the lan-
dmark case of English v. Southern Pac« Co., 
13 Utah 407, 45 P. 47 (1896), the railway 
company pressed the same argument. The 
statute in question imposed upon railway 
companies the duty of ringing bells and sou-
nding whistles when trains approached public 
crossings. The railroad argued that timely 
operation of bells and whistles was sufficient 
and "no additional duty was imposed under 
any circumstances, [sic] to prevent injury." Id. 
at 416, 45 P. at 49. Enroute to adopting the 
general rule in English, the supreme court 
observed: 
[I]n some cases it has been held that 
before a jury will be warranted in 
saying, in the absence of any stat-
utory direction to that effect, that a 
railroad company should keep a 
flagman or gates at a crossing, it 
must be shown that such crossing is 
more than ordinarily hazardous.... 
Id. at 419, 45 P. at 50. But the court ended its 
analysis without embracing the "more than 
ordinarily hazardous" idea and held instead 
that the reasonable care and prudence to be 
used must depend upon the facts of each case. 
[W]hile the statutes of Utah make 
some provision for the safety of the 
public while crossing tracks when 
crossing over the public thorough-
fares ..., yet these statutes will not 
relieve the railroad company from 
adopting such other reasonable 
measures for the public safety as 
common prudence may dictate, 
considering the danger, locality, 
travel, and surrounding circumsta-
nces of the case. 
Id. at 420,45 P. at 50 (emphasis; added). 
In Bridges v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 26 Utah 
2d 281, 488 P.2d 738 (1971), plaintiffs focused 
on the English commentary. ;md argued that 
the railroad company was negligent because 
the crossing was "more than ordinarily haza-
rdous" and the company knew it but failed to 
install adequate signals to warn the public of 
danger. Apparently intrigued by that argu-
ment, the Bridges court cited English, adopted 
the commentary, and expanded the holding: 
To authorize a jury to find negl-
igence on the part of the railroad in 
not taking additional precautions, 
there must be evidence to indicate 
that the crossing was more than 
ordinarily hazardous, i.e., there 
must be something in the configu-
ration of the land, or in the const-
ruction of the railroad, or in the 
structures in the vicinity, or in the 
nature or amount of the travel on 
the highway, or in other conditions, 
which renders the warning empl-
oyed at the crossings inadequate to 
warn the public of danger. 
Id. at 283, 488 P.2d at 739. In a recent per 
curiam decision of the Utah Supreme Court, 
this language from Bridges was quoted. Hobbs 
v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R R., 677 P 2d 
1128, 1129 (Utah 1984). Thus, the "more than 
ordinarily hazardous" doctrine rode the legal 
rails into railroad crossing negligence law in 
Utah, and we are required to apply that doc-
trine at this time.3 
We believe Gleave more accurately desenbes 
what happened at trial. The jury was specifi-
cally instructed that UDOT was statutorily 
given ultimate responsibility for crossing 
design and warning and safety devices and 
that, accordingly, it could not find Rio 
Grande negligent "based upon any defects 
which might exist with respect to the design of 
the 1600 South crossing or based upon any 
problems you may perceive in the lack of 
traffic warning devices" there. The jury pro-
ceeded to find that the crossing in this case 
was "more than ordinarily hazardous." Once 
past that threshhold, the jury was obligated to 
decide whether Rio Grande exercised reason-
able care in driving the train across this 
roadway, given the crossing's design, its 
physical characteristics, and the existing 
warning signs.4 
The statute relied upon by Rio Grande does 
not relieve it of the duty to operate trains*'with 
reasonable care, nor docs it prohibit Rio 
Grande from exercising reasonable care in the 
operation of its trains and the maintenance of 
its right-of-way. Rio Grande cannot ignore 
the public peril at a more than ordinarily 
hazardous crossing and excuse itself until 
UDOT takes action to upgrade the safety 
devices at, the 1-60(1 South crossing. Rio 
Grande remains subject to a standard of rea-
sonable care which, under the circumstances at 
this crossing, could require actions to reduce 
the risks imposed on the public. 
Two experts testified that conditions at this 
crossing made it extraordinarily dangerous. 
Due to the crossing angle, a mound of earth, 
vegetation, and a curving track, a driver pro-
ceeding east on the road could see only 285' 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code • Co's AnnoUtlon Service 
C o d e * Co 
Provo, Utah 74 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 37 
of track to the north when stopped at the 
existing stop sign. Rio Grande admitted before 
trial that the train that hit Gleave's car was 
travelling at 50 mph, the speed limit set by the 
railroad. A driver with the front end of his car 
even with the stop sign could not see a train 
moving at 50 mph (approximately 74* per 
second) until it was 4 seconds away from the 
crossing. Moreover, an audiologist testified | 
that a train whistle would not warn a motorist j 
until about 3 seconds before the train crossed 
the road. The whistle sound would be abso-
rbed by the mound of earth and vegetation in 
the curvature of the track. 
Rio Grande did install a stop sign to supp-
lement the round yellow railroad crossing sign 
and the X-shaped crossbuck. But Rio Grande 
did not introduce evidence of other affirmative 
action to reduce the risks at this crossing, such 
as straightening the track, lowering the dirt 
mound, removing obstructive vegetation, or 
lowering train speed. The; jury could thus 
reasonably find that Rio Grande, breached its 
duty of reasonable care and was, therefore, 
negligent toward Gleave. 
n . EVIDENCE OF GLEAVE'S LACK OF 
NEGLIGENCE 
In its special verdict, the jury specifically 
found no negligence on the part of Gleave. 
Rio Grande filed a motion for a new trial 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6), claiming that 
the evidence was insufficient to support this 
part of the verdict. 
On appeal, the trial court's denial of Rio 
Grande's motion must be sustained if there is 
an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision. 
Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 
1982). Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, we will reverse the 
court's ruling only if "the evidence to support 
the verdict was completely lacking or was so 
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict 
plainly unreasonable and unjust." Id. (quoting 
McCloud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 
1977)). 
Gleave testified that he pulled up to the stop 
sign and stopped his vehicle. He then looked 
to the left (north) and saw a dirt mound with 
weeds on it and 50-100' of track but no train 
approaching; then he looked to the right 
(south), where he saw no train in his unobst-
ructed view three hundred yards down the 
track. Making his decision to proceed while 
still looking southward, he began moving his 
vehicle forward slowly and glanced back to the 
left, seeing the tram rapidly bearing down on 
him and hearing its whistle for the first time. 
At that point in time, which Gleave estimated 
was 2-3 seconds before impact, Gleave test-
ified his car was 3-4' from the track. Deci-
ding he could not cross the tracks safely in 
light of the train's speed, Gleave braked. But 
by the time the car stopped, it was approxi-
mately F from the track. Although he then 
tried to put the car in reverse, he was hit by 
the train before he succeeded in shifting gears 
because the train engine overhangs the track 
by considerably more than twelve inches. 
Van Wagoner, an engineer who evaluates 
railroad crossing designs, testified that the one 
at 1600 South in Springville is the worst out of 
thousands of crossings he had seen that were 
controlled with stop signs. According to Van 
Wagoner, the stop sign creates an expectancy 
in drivers that, if they stop there, they will 
have sufficient visibility. of any hazard to 
allow them to make a decision about procee-
ding and sufficient time to then proceed and 
clear the hazard. That expectancy is not met at 
the subject crossing because a driver stopped 
at the stop sign, who does not know the 
train's actual speed, can only see 285' up the 
track to the north. If the driver sees no train 
coming from that direction, the decision is 
made to proceed while continuing to be wat-
chful for approaching trains. However, it 
takes a few seconds to react and make this 
decision, a few more for the car to accelerate, 
and a few more to mov« the car over the 
tracks and [completely out of danger. Accor-
ding to Van Wagoner, this process takes 9.1 
seconds from the stop sign, based on condit-
ions at this crossing. Such a driver is 100 
percent certain to be hit by a train moving at 
50 mph (approximately 74' per second) if the 
train is fewer than 670' away from the cros-
sing when the 9.1 second process begins. Even 
if the driver could cross the tracks in only 8 
seconds, collision would be inevitable if the 50 
mph train was any closer than 590' away 
when the process began. The driver is trapped 
because, by the time the 50 mph train is 
visible, there is not enough time to continue 
I and cross the tracks safely or to stop the car, 
I change gears, and back up out of the train's 
path. 
On appeal, Gleave does not deny that he 
had a duty to exercise reasonable care in 
operating his vehicle over the railroad cros-
sing; instead, he says the evidence shows he 
carried out that duty. 
The law requires that a traveler, 
approaching a railroad crossing, 
look and listen, and, if necessary, 
stop to avoid being injured by 
trains. This is his duty at all times 
and on all occasions, whether his 
view be obstructed or unobstructed, 
and the greater the hazard or 
danger surrounding him, the greater 
is the care required of him. 
Lundquist v. Kennecott Copper Co.,30 Utah 
2d 262, 266, 516 P.2d 1182, 1184 (1973). Rio 
Grande argues that Gleave's own testimony 
shows him to be negligent as a matter of law 
because he did not stop a second time at a 
point where he was close enough to the track 
to see further northward, but far enough from 
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the track that a passing train would still clear 
the front end of his car. 
A plaintiff is contributorily neg-
ligent as a matter of law, if all 
reasonable minds would conclude 
that he failed to use the degree of 
care which an ordinary, reasonable, 
and prudent person would have 
observed for his own safety under 
the circumstances. 
Id. at 266, 516 P.2d at 1185. Based on all the 
evidence in the record, we hold that Gleave's 
conduct was not negligent as a matter of law. 
All reasonable minds would not necessarily 
conclude that Gleave failed to exercise reaso-
nable care under the circumstances he faced. 
Van Wagoner testified that a driver who 
moved his car several feet beyond the stop 
sign and stopped with the front end at a spot 
10* from the rail could still only see north-
ward 285', resulting in no gain in sight dist-
ance.5 From that spot, the "reaction, decision, 
acceleration, and clearance" process would still 
take 8.6 seconds, resulting inevitably in a 
collision with an unseen 50 mph train up to 
636' away when the process began, as discu-
ssed above. 
Gleave's crossing design expert, Mitchell, 
stated it was possible to stop a car beyond the 
stop sign and have a clear view northward 
440' up the track, providing approximately 6 
seconds to cross the tracks before a train 
farther away than that could reach the cros-
sing. But in this position, "very close* to the 
track, a passing train would just miss the front 
end of the stopped car because the train 
engine is nearly 5* wider than the track. 
Van Wagoner testified that a driver who 
stopped with the front of his car 4* from the 
track and then proceeded—upon seeing no 
oncoming train-would still take approxi-
mately 7 seconds to react, decide, and move 
across safely, making a collision inevitable if a 
50 mph train was out of sight but fewer than 
518' away when the process began. 
Rio Grande's accident reconstruction 
expert, Limpert, testified that it was physically 
possible to stop a car at a safe point only 7' 
from the rail, but he did not testify to the 
length of the sight distance northward from 
that point. In his testimony, Limpert forcef-
ully challenged the validity of the assumptions 
and factors used in Van Wagoner's calculat-
ions, e.g., the maximum speed possible given 
the track's condition and the inclusion of 
decision and reaction time in the computat-
ions. Limpert also provided his expert 
opinion, illustrated by a videotape of a car 
being driven over the crossing from a standstill 
and from various distance away, that the 
times necessary to cross safely were roughly 
one-third of the estimates given by Van 
Wagoner. However, it was for the jury to give 
these conflicting opinions whatever weight it 
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deemed appropriate. Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 
667 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 1983). 
We decline to hold that, as a matter of law, 
all reasonable persons would conclude 
Gleave's duty at this dangerous crossing was 
to inch his car forward past the established 
stop sign to stop a second time in this narrow 
and precarious zone which afforded no greater 
degree of safety when a train approaching at 
50 mph was close but still out of view. Cf. 
Seybold v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 121 Utah 61, 
70-71, 239 P.2d 174, 179 (1951) (plaintiff 
either failed to look, looked but failed to see 
what was there, or looked and failed to see the 
oncoming train because blinded by lights but 
proceeded anyway); Drummond v. Union Pac. 
R.R. Co., 11 Utah 289, 177 P.2d 903, 906 
(1947) (plaintiff would have had clear view of 
25-30 mph train if she had stopped in a place 
"which afforded her both safety and an opp-
ortunity to look"). 
There is substantial evidence on which a 
jury could reasonably base a finding that 
Gleave exercised reasonable care under the 
circumstances and yet failed to see the onco-
ming train until it was too late to avoid the 
collision. Accordingly, we affirm the trial 
court's denial of Rio Grande's motion for a 
new trial. 
HI. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Gleave alleged in his complaint that UDOT 
breached its statutory duty under Utah Code 
Ann. §§54-4-14 through 15.1 (1986) to 
install, maintain and improve safety signals 
and devices at the 1600 South railroad crossing 
in Springville« Although there was a yellow 
warning sign, a crossbuck, and a stop sign at 
this crossing, he claimed that UDOT knew or 
should have known of the unreasonably dan-
gerous condition there and that it negligently 
failed to install "adequate" safety signals or 
devices. 
The trial court granted UDOT's motion to 
dismiss the complaint based on sovereign 
immunity. In so ruling, the court stated that 
"the decision of whether or not to install a 
safety signal at a particular crossing is a disc-
retionary one protected by the Governmental 
Immunity Act / impliedly holding that the 
allegedly negligent actions of UDOT constit-
uted a governmental function protected by the 
grant of immunity in Utah Code Ann. §63-
30-3(1986). 
On appeal, Rio Grande makes two argum-
ents challenging this ruling: (1) UDOT's reg-
ulation of traffic warning devices at railroad 
crossings is not a "governmental, function" 
within the purview of section 63-30-3* and, 
therefore, UDOT.is not immune from suit; 
and (2) the trial court erroneously concluded 
that UDOT's failure to install different safety 
devices at the subject crossing fell within the 
"discretionary function" exception to the 
waiver of immunity in Utah Code Annc §63-
consnlt Code •Go's Annotation Service 
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30-10(1) (1986).* 
A. GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
("Act") states that, "[e]xcept as may be othe-
rwise provided in this chapter, all governme-
ntal entities are immune from suit for any 
injury which results from the exercise of a 
governmental function.../ Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-3 (1986). In Standiford v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), 
the Utah Supreme Court abandoned the 
"governmental versus proprietary function" 
analysis previously used in deciding whether 
an entity was immune from suit for injuries 
resulting from a particular activity. In doing 
so, the court recognized that the Act does not 
expressly or impliedly set up such a dichotomy 
and that the results of the application of this 
analysis had been inconsistent and unpredict-
able. See id. at 1232-35. The court articul-
ated a new test and redefined a governmental 
function as an activity "of such a unique 
nature that it can only be performed by a, 
governmental agency or that it is essential to 
the core of governmental activity." Id. at 
1237. Under the ne\f test, the Standiford court 
concluded the' operation, of' a public golf 
course is not a governmental function. Id. 
The next year, in Johnson v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 629 P.2d 432, 434 (Utah 1981), the 
court explained: "The first part of the Stand-
iford test-activity of such a unique nature 
that it can only be performed by a governm-
ental agency-does not refer to what gove-
rnment may do, but to what government alone 
must do." 
The Utah Supreme Court has applied the 
Standiford test numerous times, concluding 
that the maintenance of traffic control devices,7 
supervision of financial institutions,8 the* 
issuance of motor vehicle titles and ownership 
recordkeeping responsibilities,9 and supervision 
of subdivision development and canal fence 
construction10 are governmental functions 
within the meaning of the Act. Supervision of 
disbursement of escrowed funds,11 the provi-
sion of winter recreational areas on a public 
golf course,12 and the operation of a sewage 
system13 have been held not to be governme-
ntal functions. 
UDOT is statutorily empowered to "provide 
for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, 
and improving of automatic and other safety 
appliances, signals or devices at grade cross-
ings," Utah Code Ann. §54-4-15.1 (1986), 
and to apportion costs of such projects among 
public and private entities. Utah Code Ann. 
§54-4-15.3 (1986). The government alone 
must consistently regulate safety devices at 
railroad crossings, determine which devices at 
which crossings should be recommended for 
federal funding, rank crossings in order of 
need for upgrading in light of limited funds 
for that purpose, and apportion signal instal-
lation costs between public and private enti-
ties. As a practical matter, the private sector 
cannot perform these functions. Accordingly, 
we hold that the regulation of public safety 
needs and the evaluation, installation, maint-
enance and improvement of safety signals or 
devices at railroad crossings is a governmental 
function immunized from suit under section 63-
30-3 of the Act. 
B. DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION 
EXCEPTION 
In light of this holding, we must next dete-
rmine whether UDOT's allegedly negligent 
failure to install different safety signals at the 
1600 South crossing in Springville is a 
"discretionary function" within the meaning of 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(l)(a), an exc-
eption to the waiver of immunity in that sta-
tutory section: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all 
'governmental entities is waived for 
injury proximately caused by a 
negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the 
scope of employment except if the 
injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exer-
cise or perform a discretionary 
function, whether or not the discr-
etion is abused[.] 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
this "discretionary function" exception was 
"intended to shield those governmental acts 
and decisions impacting on large numbers of 
people in a myriad of unforeseeable ways 
from individual and class legal actions, the 
continual threat of which would make public 
administration all but impossible." Frank v. 
State, 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 1980). The 
Frank court noted its prior observation, in Car-
roll v. State Road Comm'n, 27 Utah 2d 
384, 388, 496 P.2d 888, 891 (1972), that virt-
ually all acts require the exercise of some 
degree of discretion and that the statutory 
exception should thus be confined to 
those decisions and acts occurring 
at the "basic policy-making level/ 
and not extended to those acts and 
decisions taking place at the oper-
ational level, or, in other words, " 
... those which concern routine, 
everyday matters, not requiring 
evaluation of broad policy factors." 
Frank, 613 P.2dat520. 
More recently, in Little v. Utah State Div. 
of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), the 
court adopted the following test for distingu-
ishing between functions at the policy-
making level from those at the operational 
level, requiring affirmative answers to four 
preliminary questions in order for an act to be 
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purely discretionary: 
(1) Does the challenged act, omis-
sion, or decision necessarily involve 
a basic governmental policy, 
program, or objective? 
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, 
or decision essential to the realiza-
tion or accomplishment of that 
policy, program, or objective as 
opposed to one which would not 
change the course or direction of 
the policy, program, or objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission, or dec-
ision require the exercise of basic 
policy evaluation, judgment, and 
expertise on the part of the gover-
nmental agency involved? 
(4) Does the governmental agency 
involved possess the requisite con-
stitutional, statutory, or lawful 
authority and duty to do or make 
the challenged act, omission, or 
decision? 
Id. at 51. 
With regard to the case before us, the first 
question presented by Little must be answered 
affirmatively. The basic governmental objec-
tive involved in "installing, maintaining, rec-
onstructing, and improving" safety devices is 
the consistent promotion of public safety, a 
basic government objective. Evaluating all of 
the approximately 1,280 railroad crossings in 
the state and assigning priorities for safety 
signal upgrades is essential to the realization 
of the protection of public safety, especially in 
light of the fact that there are not unlimited 
funds available to upgrade all needy crossings 
at once. Thus, the second question of the Little 
test must also be answered affirmatively. 
UDOT exercises "basic policy evaluation, 
judgment, and expertise" when evaluating 
railroad crossings for safety signal improve-
ments and when deciding which crossings 
should have upgraded safety appliances first. 
In applying UDOT's safety policy, UDOT's 
surveillance team performs on-site inspect-
ions and weighs the numerous factors relating 
to crossing safety. The team consists of tran-
sportation experts who exercise their collective 
judgment and expertise in making their eval-
uations of the relative dangerousness of rail-
road crossings in Utah, taking into consider-
ation their physical characteristics and confi-
gurations, the volume and type of vehicular 
and train traffic, and other relevant factors. 
Thus, the third Little question must be answ-
ered affirmatively. 
Finally, Utah Code Ann. §54-4-14 et 
seq. (1986) empowers UDOT with the autho-
rity to supervise and regulate the safety of all 
the State's railroad crossings, including the 
authority to provide for the installing, maint-
aining, reconstructing, and improving of 
safety devices and signals there. Utah Code 
Ann. §54-4-15.1 (1986). UDOT clearly has 
the legal authority to use the monies available 
for safety signal improvement at the most 
dangerous crossings first, which means that 
other less dangerous crossings, such as this 
one, must await their turn for improvement. 
Thus, the answer to the fourth Little question 
is affirmative. 
We therefore hold that UDOT's failure to 
install different safety signals or devices at the 
subject crossing was a purely discretionary 
function within the meaning of section 63-30-
10(l)(a). 
Prior Utah case law supports this conclu-
sion. In Velasquez v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2A 
Utah 2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the Utah Public 
Service Commission's alleged failure to 
require better warning devices at a railroad 
crossing involved the exercise of a discretio-
nary function for which immunity was not 
waived. The Velasquez plaintiff, a passenger 
in a pickup truck hit by a train, claimed that 
the state agency was liable for failing to 
require additional safety devices at the cros-
sing. Affirming summary judgment in the 
agency's favor, the court concluded that the 
statutory directive to the PSC to prescribe the 
installation of "appropriate" safety or other 
devices by the railroad company (under a prior 
version of section 54-4-14) indicated a leg-
islative intent to confer discretion on the res-
ponsible agency at the time, i.e., the Public 
Service Commission: 
The statute gives the respondent 
[PSC] the power to require a diff-
erent safety device at the crossing in 
question, but that does not mean 
that the plaintiff should recover 
simply because a better warning 
signal could or should have been 
installed. The Public Service Com-
mission has the discretion to require 
the installation of such signals as in 
its judgment the health or safety of 
employees, passengers, customers or 
the public may require. 
Jd.at218,469P.2dat6. 
We find no merit in Rio Grande's argument 
that Velasquez has been overruled by Standi-
ford and Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 
(Utah 1980). As previously noted, Standiford 
overruled only those cases applying, the 
"governmental versus proprietary function" 
analysis in deciding whether or not section 63-
30-3 immunity applied to the allegedly inju-
rious activity in the first place. In Velasquez, 
the court did not apply the later discredited 
mode of analysis; instead, it merely assumed 
there was a governmental function and 
focused solely on the applicability of the dis-
cretionary function exception. Similarly, in 
Bigelow, the court applied the "basic policy-
making level versus operational lever distin-
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ction set forth in Frank, discussed above, and 
concluded that the design of the street traffic 
control system did not involve decisions and 
acts at the basic policy-making level and, 
therefore, was not a discretionary function 
within section 63-30-10(1). Bigelow, 618 
P.2dat53. 
However, as stated above, the allegedly 
negligent omission in this case does involve 
decisions and acts at the basic policy-making 
level. The trial court thus correctly concluded 
that UDOTs failure to install different safety 
devices or signals at the 1600 South crossing in 
Springville comes within the discretionary 
function exception of section 63-30-
10(l)(a). We therefore affirm the dismissal of 
the complaint against UDOT. 
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLAIM 
Gleave alleged that Rio Grande had know-
ledge of dangerous conditions at the crossing 
and "willfully or recklessly failed to take any 
corrective steps." At the close of Gleave's 
evidence, Rio Grande moved for a directed 
verdict on Gleave1 s punitive damage claim 
because of insufficiency of the evidence. Rio 
Grande argued that there was not one scintilla 
of evidence of willful or malicious activity on 
its part. Gleave agreed there was no proof of 
actual malice, but argued there was sufficient 
evidence of reckless conduct for the jury to 
imply malice. 
The trial court granted Rio Grande's 
motion and withdrew the punitive damage 
issue from the jury's consideration; however, 
it is not clear whether that ruling was based on 
inadequate evidence of actual malice or 
implied malice. 
In reviewing the correctness of the trial 
court's grant of a directed verdict to Rio 
Grande on Gleave's punitive damage claim, 
we must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to him, the party against whom the 
motion was made. Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 
1270, 1271 (Utah 1980). If there is no evidence 
to justify punitive damages, the issue was 
properly withheld from the jury. Tripp v. 
Bagley, 75 Utah 42, 282 P. 1026 (1929). If, 
however, reasonable inferences supporting 
judgment for the losing party could be drawn 
from the evidence presented at trial, the dire-
cted verdict cannot be sustained. Little 
America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112, 
114 (Utah 1982); Kim, 610 P.2d at 1271. This 
is so even if reasonable persons might reach 
different conclusions on the punitive damage 
issue after considering the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences therefrom. See Little 
America Refining Co., 641 P.2d at 114. 
Before punitive damages may be awarded, 
the plaintiff must prove conduct that is willful 
and malicious or that manifests a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, 
the rights of others. Atkin Wright & Miles v. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 
330, 337 (Utah 1985); Synergetics v. Marathon 
Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1112-13 (Utah 
1985); Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 84 
(Utah App. 1987). 
In our review of Rio Grande's duty of care, 
we noted substantial evidence from which a 
jury could reasonably conclude that Rio 
Grande was negligent. But evidence of simple 
negligence alone does not support an award of 
punitive damages. 
Punitive damages should be 
awarded infrequently. Simple negl-
igence will never suffice as a basis 
upon which such damages may be 
awarded. "[They] are not awarded 
for mere inadvertence, mistake, 
errors of judgment and the like, 
which constitute ordinary neglig-
ence." 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 
1179, 1186 (Utah 1983) (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §908 comment b (1979)).14 
In Behrens, the Utah Supreme Court iden-
tified three elements of the type of conduct 
that will support an award of punitive 
damages against a defendant in a negligence 
action who acts "maliciously or in reckless 
disregard for the rights of others." Although 
actual intent to cause injury is not necessary, 
the defendant must either know or 
should know "that such conduct 
would, [1] in a high degree of pro-
bability, result in substantial harm 
to another," Danculovich v. Brown, 
Wyo., 593 P.2d 187, 193 (1979), 
and [2] the conduct must be "highly 
unreasonable conduct, or an 
extreme departure from ordinary 
care, [3] in a situation where a high 
degree of danger is apparent." Id. 
at 191. 
Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1186-87 (numbering 
added). 
We now evaluate the evidence presented by 
Gleave in light of these three elements: 
(1) High degree of probability. There was 
uncontroverted testimony that there had been 
no accidents at this crossing up to the time of 
UDOT's inspection and evaluation in 1974. 
After that time, Rio Grande installed stop 
signs as a temporary measure until UDOT 
upgraded the crossing with flashing red lights. 
Gleave's attorney claimed he would offer 
evidence at trial of "near misses" at the cros-
sing, but none was produced. The locality was 
rural, and the road not heavily travelled. 
There is no evidence that Rio Grande knew or 
should have known of the facts discovered by 
Gleave's experts after this accident. In any 
event, the evidence shows a low degree of 
probability. 
(2) Highly unreasonable conduct or extreme 
departure from ordinary care. At worst, the 
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evidence shows errors of judgment, i.e., ord-
inary negligence on the part of Rio Grande, in 
failing to take steps to reduce the risks at this 
crossing. There is no evidence of an extreme 
departure from ordinary care. 
(3) High degree of danger apparent. A 
degree of danger exists at every railroad cro-
ssing. The evidence showed the degree of 
danger at this crossing was high. The crossing 
was more than ordinarily hazardous. But, was 
the extent of that danger readily apparent 
prior to this accident? Perhaps reasonable 
minds couid differ concerning this prong of 
the Behrens test, but the first two prongs 
remain unsatisfied. 
Moreover, the general rule is that only 
compensatory damages are appropriate and 
that punitive damages may be awarded only in 
exceptional cases. Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1186. 
The evidence shows nothing exceptional about 
Rio Grande's conduct in this case. 
Furthermore, punitive damages 
should be awarded only when they 
will clearly accomplish a public 
objective not accomplished by the 
award of compensatory damages 
.... The intended deterrent effect 
must be clear and in proportion to 
the nature of the wrong and the 
possibility of recurrence. 
Id. at 1187. Gleave has not directed our atte-
ntion to any public objective which would 
clearly be accomplished by an award of pun-
itive damages hereinc Where the wrong is the 
result of simple negligence, there is nothing to 
deter. We believe the substantial compensatory 
award will provide ample motivation for Rio 
Grande to take appropriate measures to 
protect the public and itself from a recurrence 
of this unfortunate accident. 
There is no evidence of malice, actual or 
implied, that would justify an award of pun-
itive damages against Rio Grande. The trial 
court thus properly withheld that issue from 
the jury. 
V. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
In the special verdict returned in this case, 
the jury awarded Gleave the following item-
ized damages: 
A. Past medical expenses $56,000 
Be Future medical expenses $22,540 
C. Past lost wages $20,000 
D. Loss of future earnings 
and earning capacity $275,000 
E. General Damages $50,000 
F. Market value of Gleave 
vehicle $1,600 
Total $425,140 
The trial court granted Gleave's post-trial 
motion to amend his complaint to include a 
claim for prejudgment interest on items A, C, 
and D, under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-44 
(1987). Gleave's request for prejudgment int-
erest on items A and C was granted, but the 
court denied prejudgment interest on item D. 
It is true, as Gleave asserts, that lost future 
earning capacity is a special damage insofar as 
pleading requirements are concerned. Cohn v. 
J. C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 
1975). But we must still decide whether section 
78-27-44 authorizes prejudgment interest on 
all types of special damages, whether they 
arise before or after entry of a plaintiff's 
personal injury judgment. 
In construing this legislation, we must give 
effect to the legislature's underlying intent, 
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 
3 (Utah 1984), and assume that each term in 
the statute was used advisedly. West Jordan v. 
Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). We 
will interpret and apply the statute according 
to its literal wording unless it is unreasonably 
confused or inoperable. Id.; Home v. Home, 
737 P.2d 244, 247 (Utah App. 1987). A proper 
construction of its terms must further the 
statute's purposes. RDG Assocs./Jorman 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 741 P.2d 948, 
951 (Utah 1987). 
The statute provides: 
In all actions brought to recover 
damages for personal injuries sust-
ained by any person, resulting from 
or occasioned by the tort of any 
other person, corporation, associa-
tion or partnership, whether by 
negligence or willful intent of that 
other person, corporation, associa-
tion or partnership, and whether 
that injury shall have resulted 
fatally or otherwise, it shall be 
lawful for the plaintiff in the com-
plaint to claim interest on the 
special damages alleged from the 
date of the occurrence of the act 
giving rise to the cause of action 
and it shall be the duty of the 
court, in entering judgment for 
plaintiff in that action, to add to 
the amount of damages assessed by 
the verdict of the jury ... interest on 
that amount calculated at 8% per' 
annum from the date of the occur-
rence of the act giving rise to the 
cause of action to the date of ent-
ering the judgment, and to include 
it in that judgment. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-44 (1987) 
(emphasis added). We agree with Rio Grande 
that this emphasized phrase clearly modifies 
"special damages/ limiting those special 
damages on which prejudgment interest is 
recoverable to those that arise in the period 
between the act giving rise to the cause of 
action and entry of judgment in plaintiffs 
favor. 
This interpretation of the statute furthers its 
purpose, as documented in its legislative 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code • Co's Annotation Service 
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history. When first introduced at the 1975 
Legislature by Senator Renstrom as Senate Bill 
153 and later passed by the Senate, the word 
"special" was not in the proposed statute; 
prejudgment interest was to be awarded a 
successful plaintiff on all "damages alleged 
from the date of the occurrence of the act 
...." Utah Senate Tr. of 3rd Reading of S.B. 
153, February 20,1975. 
At the bill's second and third reading in the 
House of Representatives, however, there was 
a lengthy discussion of the problems with such 
a broad prejudgment interest provision. Utah 
House of Reps. Tr. of 2nd and 3rd Reading of 
S.B. 153, March 13, 1975. Some legislators 
voiced their concerns about accrual of interest 
on damages in a malpractice action where the 
cause of action did not even accrue until dis-
covery of the injury, possibly many years after 
the date the injurious act occurred. A similar 
concern was voiced regarding injured minors 
who waited until after reaching majority age 
before bringing their lawsuits; under the pro-
posed statute, interest could accrue for many 
years. Others feared the effect such a law 
would have on doctors' malpractice insurance 
rates and on all casualty insurance premiums 
in the state. 
Toward the end of the House debate, Rep-
resentative Fisher offered an amendment to 
add the word "special* before the word 
"damages" in the bill, explaining that special 
damages are the expenses paid for those who 
are injured so they can immediately receive 
necessary medical and hospital care. He added 
that special damages are 
those expenses that they have paid 
out of pocket, for which they have 
used their own money and which 
they will not get until the settlement 
of their action. Getting interest on 
their out-of-pocket expenses will 
provide a total recoupment of any 
expenses that they have had from 
the time of the accident until they 
are paid in full by a recovery at 
court or by settlement. I believe it's 
a reasonable and a very logical 
amendment that interest on special 
damages be endorsed by us, and in 
that form we will pass the intent of 
the bill of paying for all expenses 
until such time as judgment is ren-
dered, and we will not be assessing 
an interest on something that 
neither of the parties know. 
Id. (emphasis added). In its amended form, 
Senate Bill 153 then passed in the House by 
five votes. When the amended bill was retu-
rned to the Senate later the same day, Senator 
Renstrom made a motion that the Senate 
concur in the House amendment. After that 
motion passed, the amended bill passed the 
Senate with no further discussion. Utah Senate 
Tr. of Vote on S.B. 153, March 13,1975. 
The legislative history and the statutory 
language reveal the legislature's intent to dis-
tinguish between special damages accruing 
between the date of the injurious act and the 
entry of judgment (such as medical expenses 
or lost wages) and those (such as lost future 
earnings and future earning capacity) that will 
arise subsequent to entry of judgment, and to 
authorize prejudgment interest only on the 
former category of special damages.15 The trial 
court thus properly denied Gleave prejudg-
ment interest under section 78-27-44 on that 
portion of damages in the special jury verdict 
designated as "lost future earnings and earning 
capacity." 
CONCLUSION 
We have considered the other issues raised 
by Rio Grande and find them meritless. The 
judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs 
are awarded only to UDOT. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. Rio Grande also claimed it was entitled to have 
the jury instructed that it could reduce Gleave's 
damages if it found that he failed to mitigate his 
damages by not wearing a seat belt. That issue was 
recently resolved adversely to Rio Grande's position 
in Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300, 303-04 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
2. Utah Code Ann. §54-4-15(2) and (4) (1986) 
provide: 
(2) The department shall have the 
power to determine and prescribe the 
manner, including the particular point 
of crossing, and the terms of installa-
tion, operation, maintenance, use and 
protection ... of each crossing of a 
public road or highway by a railroad or 
street railroad, and of a street by a rai-
lroad or vice versa, and to alter or 
abolish any such crossing, to restrict the 
use of such crossings to certain types of 
traffic in the interest of public safety .... 
(4) The commission shall retain excl-
usive jurisdiction for the resolution of 
any dispute upon petition by any person 
aggrieved by any action of the depart-
ment pursuant to this section. 
Utah Code Ann. §54-4-15.1 (1986) provides: 
The Department of Transportation so 
as to promote the public safety shall as 
prescribed in this act provide for the 
installing, maintaining, reconstructing, 
and improving of automatic and other 
safety appliances, signals or devices at 
grade crossings on public highways or 
roads over the tracks of any railroad or 
street railroad corporation in the state. 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code^Cos Annotation Service 
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3. Although this doctrine is unnecessary and conf-
using, it makes no difference in the present case. See 
the unpublished opinion of U. S. District Judge 
Bruce A. Jenkins in Wilde v. Denver & Rio Grande 
W. R.R. Co., No. C-83-149J, slip op. at 16 (D. 
Ut. April 3,1985): 
In conclusion, the court would be 
remiss if it did not express its criticism 
of the doctrine of the "more than ordi-
narily hazardous" crossing. The Utah 
Supreme Court should, at its first opp-
ortunity, examine the doctrine with an 
eye to eliminating it. The court believes 
that instructing a fact finder that it 
cannot find a railroad negligent for 
operating a train through a crossing 
without taking additional precautions 
unless it first finds that the warnings at 
the crossing were inadequate to warn the 
public adds nothing—except perhaps 
confusion-to an instruction that the 
railroad has a duty to operate its trains 
with reasonable care, [f the warnings are 
adequate, a jury would find that a rea-
sonable person would not add additional 
warnings. A special doctrine is not nec-
essary. 
[RJights and duties of a traveler and of 
a railroad company at crossings are 
mutual and reciprocal .... [AJ railroad 
company, merely because it is the 
favored traffic, [may not] carelessly and 
heedlessly operate its trains over cross-
ings at an unusual and excessive speed 
and without giving adequate warnings, 
or create a misleading set of circumsta-
nces and rely upon the assumption that 
the traveling public may look out for 
their safety and keep out of the way of 
the trains. 
Toomer's Estate v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 121 Utah 
37, 58-59, 239 P.2d 163, 173 (1951). 
5. We note that Utah law requires a driver approa-
ching a railroad crossing to stop "within fifty feet but 
not less than ten feet from the nearest track of 
such railroad" when an approaching train "is plainly 
visible and is in hazardous proximity to such cros-
sing." Utah Code Ann. §41-6-95(a)(4) (1982) 
(emphasis added). 
6. In his cross-appeal, Gleave did not challenge the 
trial court's dismissal of UDOT. Rio Grande, in 
both its opposition to UDOT's pretrial motion to 
dismiss and in its appeal to this court, has not con-
tended that Gleave's injury was caused by UDOT's 
creation of a dangerous condition on a road, for 
which immunity is expressly waived in Utah Code 
Ann. §63-30-8 (1986). This separate waiver 
provision is not subject to the "discretionary func-
tion" exception in section 63-30-10(1). Sanford v. 
University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741, 
745 (1971). See Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276, 
278 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 
618 P.2d 50, 54 n.3 (Utah 1980). 
7. Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985) 
(per curiam). 
8. Afadsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). 
9. Metropolitan Fin. Co. v. State, 714 P.2d 293 
(Utah 1986) (per curiam). 
NCE REPORTS Provo, Utah 
10. Loveland v. Orcm City Corp., 70 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 2 (1987). 
11. Cox v. Utah Mortg. & Loan Co., 716 P.2d 783 
(Utah 1986). 
12. Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 432 
(Utah 1981). 
13. Dalton v. Salt Lake Sub. San. Dist., 676 P.2d 
399 (Utah 1984); Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642 
P.2d 737 (Utah 1982). 
14. We note that the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§908 (1979) states: 
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other 
than compensatory or nominal damages, 
awarded against a person to punish him 
for his outrageous conduct and to deter 
him and others like him from similar 
conduct in the future. 
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded 
for conduct that is outrageous, because 
of the defendant's evil motive or his 
reckless indifference to the rights of 
others.... 
15. The latter type is, of course, subject to the sta-
tutory interest rate on judgments in Utah Code 
Ann. §15-1-4(1986). 
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Kent Do Hansen, and Sylvia V. Hansen, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
GREEN RIVER GROUP, a Utah general 
partnership, Boyd Hansen, Ramon D. Pratt, 
Nolan Wathen, Arthur Melville, Marsha 
Utaine, Brent P. Pratt, and Synvest 
Corporation, a Nevada corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Before Judges Jackson, Billings and 
Greenwood. 
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Jackson Howard, Danielle Eyer Davis for 
Appellants. 
George M. Harmond, Jr . for Melville and 
Utain. 
Dale R. Kent for Green River Group. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
This litigation arose from real estate trans-
actions involving the Green River Motel. 
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Robert J. DeBry, Esq. 
ROBERT J- DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4001 South 700 East, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
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1 M. Warner, Esq. 
istant Attorney General for the 
tale of Utah 
orney for Defendant-Respondent Utah 
apartment of Transportation, State of Utah 
State Capital Building 
t Lake City, Utah 84114 
Pursuant to Rule 45(c) Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, Gleave moves this Court for an order extending the 
time for filing his Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
On February 22, 1988, the Court of Appeals denied 
Gleave's Petition for Reconsideration, (Exhibit "A"). Thus, 
the time for filing the Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
would run on March 23, 1988. 
However, Gleave has filed a subsequent motion 
(Exhibit "B"). It is not clear from the rules whether this 
subsequent motion will toll the time for filing the Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari. (See Rule 45(c) Rules of Utah 
Supreme Court.) 
Therefore, Gleave moves for an order extending the 
time for filing the Petition for Writ of Certiorari 30 days 
front any ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals denying 
plaintiff's pending motion (Exhibit "B") or to April 21, 
1988, whichever is earlier. 
DATED this Jjjih day of March, 1988. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
By y'c~&, ~J-/// ^n 
ROBERT J./tEBRY 
ORDER 
For good cause shown, it is hereby ordered that the 
time for Gleave to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
extended from March 23, 1988 to ~5Q days after any denial of 
the Court of Appeals of Gleave's pending motion (Exhibit 
"B"), or to April -2£, 1988, whichever is earlier. 
DATED this /f^ day of / ^ ^ ^ , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
r r r *^ <^ r-^*cL 
fONORASLH JUSTICE OF THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
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Attorneys for Rio Grande and Utah Railway Company 
P.O. Box 3400 
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Paul M. Warner, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General for the 
State of Utah 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent Utah 
Department of Transportation, State of Utah 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
-4-
Richard C. Davidson 
Associate Priwidmi; Jud^c 
Russell W. Bench 
Judge 
Judith M. Billings 
Judjjc 
Pamela T. Greenwood 
Judge 
Norman H. Jackson 
Jud«r 
Gregory K. Orme 
Judge 
^fitai] (Hour! at Appeals 
400 Midcown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(S01) 533-6800 
F e b r u a r y 2 2 , 1988 
Timorhv M. Shea 
( Ic-rk . , f ' h r Court 
Robert J. Debry 
Attorney at Law 
Robert J. Debry & Associates 
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In Re: 
Robert L. Gleave, 
Plaintiff, Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
v. Court of Appeals No. 350057-CA 
Denver & Rio Grande Western and No. 860C53-CA 
Railroad Company, a Utah corporation, 
Utah Railway Company, a corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
and Cross-Respondents, 
and 
State of Utah, Department of 
Transportation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Upon consideration of the appellant's petition for 
rehearing heretofore filed herein, and the arguments of 
counsel thereupon had, it is ordered that the rehearing 
is denied. 
Sincerely, 
Janice Hill 
Case Manager 
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Utan Court of Appe«l3 
Robert L. Gleave, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
V . 
Denver St Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Company, a corpora-
tion, and Utah Railway Company, 
a corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants 
and Cross-Respondents, 
and 
State of Utah, Department of 
Transportation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Before Judges Bench, Jackson and Garff. 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
No. 860057-CA 
No. 860058-CA 
Plaintiff Glea 
reconsideration of , 
Defendant Rio Grand 
punitive damage cla 
correctly asserts t 
point, we took into 
of near-misses at t 
indicates in his pe 
near-miss and prior 
pre-trial ruling, 
cross-appeal the is 
excluded his proffe 
we have not and wil 
ve filed with this court a petition for 
whether the trial court erred in granting 
ees motion for directed verdict on Gleave's 
im. In support of his petition, Gleave 
hat, in evaluating the evidence on this 
consideration the absence of any evidence 
he subject railroad crossing. However, he 
tition--for the first time—that his 
accident evidence was excluded in a 
Because Gleave did not raise in his 
sue of whether the court erroneously 
red near-raiss and prior accident evidence, 
1 not address the issue. 
Reviewing the correctness of the directed verdict in 
light of the evidence actually presented and admitted at 
trial, we adhere to the conclusion in our January 28, 1988 
opinion that the trial court properly withheld the issue of 
punitive damages from the jury because there was no evidence 
in the record of actual or implied malice on the part of Rio 
Grande. 
Gleave's petition for reconsideration is, therefore, 
denied. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
ROBERT J. DEBRx - A0849 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Robert J. DeBry, Esq. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4001 South 700 East, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
Robert L. Gleave 
E. Scott Savage, Esq. 
Michael R. Richman, Esq. 
Patrick J. O'Hara, Esq. 
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Attorneys for Rio Grande and 
Utah Railway Company 
P.O. Box 3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400 
Faul M. Warner, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General for the 
State of Utah 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent Utah 
Department of Transportation, State of Utah 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
PETITION FOR 
SUSPENSION OF RULES 
Case No. 8600057-CA 
Case No. 8600058-CA 
Pursuant to Rule 2 of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals1, Gleave moves this Court to suspend Rule 35(d) 
for the purpose of reconsidering its Order of February 22, 
1988.2 The grounds for this motion are as follows: 
1. At trial, Gleave offered evidence of "near 
misses" as well as two prior accidents. The evidence was 
refused by the Court. However, Gleave preserved an offer of 
proof. The evidence clearly should have been received. 
Robinson v. Seaboard R.R., Inc., 361 S.E. 2d 909 (N.C. App. 
1987) . 
2. During the briefing of the case, neither 
party referred to the proffered evidence of "near misses." 
Rather, both parties relied upon other evidence in the 
record. 
lMIn the interest of expediting a decision, the Court 
of Appeals . . . may . . . suspend the requirements or 
provisions of any of these rules. . . " 
2Rule 35(d) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
states, ". . consecutive petitions for rehearing will not 
be received by the clerk." Technically, this is an initial 
motion to reconsider the Order of February 22, 1988. 
However, the Court might construe this to be a "consecutive 
petition" or second petition to reconsider the opinion of 
January 28, 1988. The Court would be required to act under 
Rule 2 (to suspend Rule 35(d)) in order to consider this 
petition. 
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3. The Court's analysis of this case went beyond 
the issues raised in the briefs. Thus, this Court sua 
sponte searched the record with respect to "near misses." 
The opinion of this Court states: 
Gleave's attorney claimed he would offer 
evidence at trial of "near misses" at 
the crossing, but none was produced. 
(Slip Opinion at p. 19.) 
4. Gleave filed a Petition for Reconsideration. 
Gleave argued, inter alia, that the Court had overlooked 
plaintiff's offer of proof regarding "near misses" and prior 
accidents. 
5. This Court entered an Order (February 22, 
1988) denying the Petition for Reconsideration. With 
respect to the "near misses," this Court stated: 
Because Gleave did not raise in his 
cross-appeal the issue of whether the 
Court erroneously excluded his proffered 
near-miss and prior accident evidence, 
we have not and will not address the 
issue. 
Reviewing the correctness of the direc-
ted verdict in light of the evidence 
actually presented^ and admitted at 
trial, we adhere to the conclusion in 
our January 28, 1988, opinion. . . 
^This Court erroneously believed that this evidence was 
excluded in a pre-trial ruling. (See Order February 22, 
1988.) In fact, plaintiff's offer of proof and the Court's 
ruling came during the trial. R. 1683-1686.) 
-3-
6. It is respectfully submitted that this Court's 
Order of February 22, 1988, erred as a matter of law. The 
correct law is as follows: 
We hold the trial court erred in 
dismissing plaintiff's action . . . In 
passing on this assignment of error, 
evidence erroneously excluded is to be 
considered with other evidence offered 
by plaintiffs. Woodward v. Pressley, 
249 S.E. 2d 471 (N.C. App. 1978.) 
• * * 
In considering whether the trial court 
should have sustained defendant's 
motions for directed verdicts, this 
court will look to all the competent 
evidence, including facts which were 
shown by proof but which were withdrawn 
from the jury by the trial judge, 
especially where such evidence was 
improperly withdrawn, as we think was 
true in this case. Beene v. Cook, 311 
S.W. 2d 596, 602 (Tenn. 1957). 
In passing on the sufficiency of the 
evidence, we have considered that 
offered by plaintiff and improperly 
excluded by the court. Smith v. J.C. 
Penny Co., 149 N.W. 2d 794 (Iowa 1967). 
7. This Court's Order of February 22, 1988, 
chides plaintiff for not raising the issue of "near misses" 
until the Petition for Reconsideration. It was certainly 
Gleave's right -- and Gleave's risk -- to rely on other 
evidence, and to ignore the "near misses" evidence. This 
-4-
court, likewise, had every right to ignore the "near miss" 
evidence, since it was not raised in the briefs. 
However, this Court chose to search the record and 
to raise the issue of "near misses" sua sponte. Gieave 
concedes that the Court has power to search the record and 
raise issues sua sponte. (See e.g. Swenson v. Thibaut, 250 
S.E. 2d 279, 293 (N.C. 1978). However, having raised the 
issue, the Court must resolve it! Here the Court raised an 
issue sua sponte, but the Court did not resolve it. Rather, 
after raising the issue, the Court relied on a clearly 
erroneous ruling of the trial court. That was an error of 
law and an abdication of appellate jurisdiction. 
8. In summary, this Court should withdraw its 
Order of February 22, 1988, and thereby proceed to 
reconsider the opinion of January 28, 1983. 
DATED this y day of March, 1988. 
ROBERT J- DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR SUSPENSION OF RULES, 
(Gleave v. Rio Grande, et al.) postage prepaid this /j day 
of March, 1988, to the following: 
E. Scott Savage, Esq. 
Michael F. Richman, Esq. 
Patrick J. O'Hara, Esq. 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Rio Grande and Utah Railway Company 
P.O. Box 3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400 
Paul M. Warner, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General for the 
State of Utah 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent Utah 
Department of Transportation, State of Utah 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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Robert L. Gleave, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant/ 
Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Company, a corpora-
tion, and Utah Railway Company, 
a corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants 
and Cross-Respondents, 
and 
State of Utah, Department of 
Transportation, 
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Before Judges Bench, Jackson and Garff. 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
No. 860057-CA 
No. 860058-CA 
Plaintiff Gleave filed with this court a petition for 
reconsideration of whether the trial court erred in granting 
Defendant Rio Grande's motion for directed verdict on Gleave'< 
punitive damage claim. In support of his petition, Gleave 
correctly asserts that, in evaluating the evidence on this 
point, we took into consideration the absence of any evidence 
of near-misses at the subject railroad crossing. However, he 
indicates in his petition—for the first time—that his 
near-miss and prior accident evidence was excluded in a 
pre-trial ruling. Because Gleave did not raise in his 
cross-appeal the issue of whether the court erroneously 
excluded his proffered near-miss and prior accident evidence, 
we have not and will not address the issue. 
Reviewing the correctness of the directed verdict in 
light of the evidence actually presented and admitted at 
trial, we adhere to the conclusion in our January 28, 1988 
opinion that the trial court properly withheld the issue of 
punitive damages from the jury because there was no evidence 
in the record of actual or implied malice on the part of Rio 
Grande. 
Gleave's petition for reconsideration is, therefore, 
denied. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
